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Using Waller to Uphold First and
Sixth Amendment Rights Throughout
the COVID-19 Pandemic
Maya Chaudhuri*
Abstract
In The Right to a Public Trial in the Time of COVID-19,
Professor Stephen Smith argued that the COVID-19 pandemic
justified an almost categorical suspension of the right to a public
trial. Judges have relied on Smith’s Article to justify closure
decisions made without the constitutionally required specific
findings. These are part of a larger pattern of improper closure
determinations, many made without fully considering
alternatives to closure, since the beginning of the pandemic that
threatens the rights of individuals with criminal cases and the
collective rights of the public. But the Constitution has no
pandemic exception, and it is time to address this
unconstitutional pattern of closures as courts grapple with their
obligation to protect criminal procedural rights within a
potentially long-term public health situation. This Response
explains that following the Waller test as it was contemplated by
the Supreme Court can and will vindicate defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights and the public’s First Amendment rights
while protecting public health during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Equal Justice Works Fellow, Texas Fair Defense Project; J.D. 2021, UCLA
School of Law; B.S. 2013, Georgetown University. Thank you to my TFDP
colleagues Camilla Hsu and Nathan Fennell and Washington & Lee Law
Review editors Sarah Childs and Jordan Miceli for incredibly helpful feedback
and edits.
*
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The past two years have been marked by fundamental
questions about how courts uphold constitutional rights during
a pandemic while simultaneously working to protect public
health. One of the most critical sites for that tension is in
courtrooms themselves, which were crowded places before the
COVID-19 pandemic. Since the first closures in March 2020,
courthouses across the country have remained shuttered to
varying degrees, ranging from returning to mostly in-person
operations to remaining entirely remote to cancelling settings
wholesale for extended periods of time. These practices raise the
important question of whether judges have been properly
applying Supreme Court precedent when considering these
closures, especially given that the U.S. Constitution is
implicated each time a criminal court proceeding is closed.
In The Right to a Public Trial in the Time of COVID-19,
Professor Stephen Smith argued that the urgent onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic justified an almost categorical suspension
of the right to a public trial.1 Since its publication, federal judges
have relied on Smith’s Article to justify closure decisions made
without the constitutionally required specific findings.2 These
are part of a larger pattern of improper closure determinations,
many made without fully considering alternatives to closure,
that threatens the rights of individuals with criminal cases and
the collective rights of the public. While this may have been
attractive in the face of the sudden challenge of judicial
administration at the pandemic’s outset, neither Smith nor any
judge has proposed a limiting principle to this approach. The
Constitution, however, has no pandemic exception, and it is time
to address this unconstitutional pattern of closures as we
grapple with our obligation to protect criminal procedural rights
within a potentially long-term public health situation.

1. Stephen E. Smith, The Right to a Public Trial in the Time of
COVID-19, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 passim (2020).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Babichenko, 508 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779 (D.
Idaho 2020); United States v. Huling, 542 F. Supp. 3d 144, 147 (D.R.I. June 4,
2021).
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This Response first lays out the Waller test,3 which courts
are required to perform before closing a proceeding that
implicates the First and Sixth Amendments. It then responds to
Smith’s arguments in two parts; first to the categorical findings
and then to the suggestion that there are no reasonable
alternatives to closure. Upon examination, it is clear that
adhering to the Waller test4 as it was contemplated by the
Supreme Court can and will vindicate defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights and the public’s First Amendment rights
while protecting public health during the COVID-19 pandemic.
II.

THE WALLER TEST

In a criminal case, the defendant enjoys the right to a public
trial under the Sixth Amendment and the general public has a
right of access under the First Amendment.5 For reasons
fundamental to American democracy, courtrooms are—and long
have been—presumptively open.6 And when it is necessary to
close them in part or in total, it must be done with care. The
Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for courtroom
3. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (articulating a four-part test
for courtroom closure).
4. Id.
5. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to leave it as an open
question whether the rights under the First and Sixth Amendments are
“coextensive,” the Waller test that follows is applied consistently under both
Amendments. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010). But see Rovinsky
v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Because the public’s first
amendment right and the defendant’s sixth amendment right serve common
interests, however, the legal principles appropriate for enforcing one are
usually applicable to the other.”); see also United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d
189, 193, 203 (2d Cir. 2005) (conducting access and closure analyses under the
First and Sixth Amendments as if the rights are co-extensive).
6. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980)
(plurality) (describing how the First Amendment protects forms of
communication “necessary for a democracy to survive” including public access
to courtrooms); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir.
2002) (“Democracies die behind closed doors.”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super.
Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982) (explaining the long history
of openness to the extent that the Court had previously been unable to find an
historical example of a closed trial and the importance of public scrutiny in
“the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole,”
including permitting “the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of
self-government.”).
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closure in Waller v. Georgia: “the party seeking to close the
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to
protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make
findings adequate to support the closure.”7 The information
provided to support the interest must be specific.8 That means
specific to the case at hand, turning on the circumstances of the
case and often the setup of the courthouse or the courtroom.
Only a “small universe of cases [] will satisfy Waller.”9
III. THE FINDINGS REQUIRED UNDER WALLER
The final step of the Waller test,10 making findings with
respect to the first three steps, is perhaps the most important
step because even if each of the first three steps would have been
satisfied, the court of review can still find error if the findings
are insufficient, including if they are too general or broadly
applicable.
A.

The Repudiation of General—or Categorical—Findings

Supreme Court precedent requires a case-by-case analysis
with specific findings before closure, making categorical
findings under the Waller test11 not only a stark departure from
7. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (1984).
8. Id.
9. United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 330 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts
often recognize that not every situation calls for a full closure. Though the
Supreme Court has never addressed partial closures, several federal courts of
appeals have modified the Waller test for situations implicating partial
closures, replacing the overriding interest requirement with a substantial
interest requirement. United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98–99 (5th Cir.
1995) (collecting cases). The analysis remains as rigorous in the modified test,
with the only distinction being a lower interest required in the first step. See
id. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, federal district courts have
made findings as part of the Waller analysis that excluding members of the
public from the physical courtroom and providing remote video access
constituted a partial closure. See United States v. Babichenko, 508 F. Supp.
3d 774, 778–79 (D. Idaho 2020) (“Courts have viewed proceedings conducted
over virtual platforms like Zoom as partial closures.”).
10. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (outlining the Waller
test).
11. Id.
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prior practice, but unconstitutional. In the Supreme Court’s
most recent case involving the Waller test,12 it specifically
repudiated a generic analysis that would allow for closure
“almost as a matter of course.”13 Appellate courts regularly
overturn analyses that could apply to criminal cases in
general.14 As such, the categorical findings that Smith advances
are clearly unconstitutional. Smith’s approach might be the
most convenient one, but it turns an individualized
constitutional inquiry into a broad decision of general
application solely because it is related to public health and does
so without constitutional justification.
The application of categorical findings has led to
unnecessary closures and, even in cases of necessary closures,
the denaturing of individual and collective constitutional
procedural rights. For example, the District Court of Rhode
Island found COVID-19 necessitated the total or partial closure
of a criminal trial in June 2021.15 The court considered that
mask recommendations continued to be in effect, as they had
been since nearly the beginning of the pandemic, but not state
or local infection rates or any other local public health
information that might have been relevant to the risk of
infection. In fact, the entire state of Rhode Island had an
average number of COVID-19 cases under fifty throughout the
month of June 2021 and more than half of the state population
was fully vaccinated with the COVID-19 vaccine at the
beginning of the month.16 Instead of courtroom access, there was
12. Id.
13. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 725 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 506 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012) (“The Supreme Court in Presley took pains to emphasize that ‘broad’ or
‘generic’ concerns will not serve to justify closure; otherwise, they could become
talismans for exclusion of the public in any and every case.”); State v. Decker,
907 N.W.2d 378, 384 (N.D. 2018) (“[A] generic, broad rationale would permit
courtroom closure nearly any time.”); Bright v. State, 875 P.2d 100, 110
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (finding a judge abused discretion in part because “the
trial judge’s findings hinge[d] primarily on factors that [were] not specific to
[defendant’s] case”).
15. United States v. Huling, 542 F.Supp.3d 144, 147 (D.R.I. June 4, 2021).
The court wrote that “[p]ublic access to the trial in this matter will be equal
to, or even greater than, public access in non-pandemic times” while
simultaneously closing the courtroom doors. Id.
16. Tracking Coronavirus in Rhode Island: Latest Map and Case Count,
N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jan. 10, 2022), https://perma.cc/7ACV-YJA7; Rhode
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public access to closed circuit television in an overflow room of
the courthouse,17 which did nothing to reduce the public’s risk of
infection. There was no consideration of the defendant’s right to
have family or friends present, a right which cannot be fulfilled
through remote access.18 Nor was there mention of those who
had been targets of the alleged crime, members of the public who
often exercise their right to observe trials and find it to be an
important part of achieving justice.19 Given that communities
will likely face at least a low risk of COVID-19 for years, or
perhaps decades, it could amount to an effectively indefinite
suspension of constitutional rights if this pattern of categorical
findings continues unabated.
B.

Specific Findings Are Still Required During the COVID-19
Pandemic

The Waller test can be applied as it was intended by the
Supreme Court while achieving the simultaneous goals of
protecting public health and the First and Sixth Amendment
rights of access, and this has been true for the entirety of the
pandemic.
It is appropriate to consider whether public health concerns
constitute an overriding or substantial interest justifying total
or partial closure. Certainly, there have been historical
instances of court closures during pandemics.20 These examples
predated the Waller test but demonstrated that certain public
Island COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, RENO GAZETTE J., https://perma.cc/DU3Z8J24 (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
17. Huling, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 147 (“To best comply with the Constitution
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 53, the Court will reserve a separate viewing room in the
courthouse for the public and the press to watch a closed-circuit, live video and
audio feed of the trial.”). Members of the press have reported that being
relegated to overflow rooms throughout the pandemic has limited their ability
to observe the “full context of what’s occurring” in the case. See, e.g., David A.
Lieb, AP NEWS (Oct. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/K7AY-GQ7U.
18. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72; see also United States v.
Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012).
19. See NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHT TO
BE PRESENT, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN #3, https://perma.cc/U3T9-W39J.
20. Alicia A. Bannon & Douglas Keith, Remote Court: Principles for
Virtual Proceedings During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond, 115 NW. U.
L. REV. 1875, 1908 (2021); Jenia I. Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, 53 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 197, 223 (2021).
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health crises would merit closure. In fact, court systems
anticipated total or partial closures in the case of epidemics
leading up to the current pandemic.21 And courts are regularly
forced to consider other local public health issues.22
But in determining whether a public health issue is a
constitutional basis for a closure, courts must still make specific
findings with respect to each of the Waller factors. Those specific
findings should be based on the risk of infection to the people
who will actually attend the proceeding rather than the mere
declaration of the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic.23 This is
possible because local public health data have been available
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.24 There are other factors
to consider beyond the rate of community spread.25 It is
particularly urgent to do so going forward as many public health
officials predict the pandemic could last years and particular
regions will reach endemicity before the nation does.26
IV. MANDATORY CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES
The court’s consideration of alternatives to closure is a
critical step because it often leads to avoiding or minimizing
closure.

21. See, e.g., SUP. CT. OF VA.’S PANDEMIC FLU PREPAREDNESS COMM’N,
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA BENCH BOOK FOR VIRGINIA’S COURT SYSTEM (2017),
https://perma.cc/BLN8-MHQK (PDF).
22. See, e.g., Dodge Co. Courthouse Closed Due to Pigeon Poop, 13WMAZ
(Feb. 11, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://perma.cc/4YH3-9E8C; Aristos Georgiou,
Courthouse Closed Due to Bed Bugs Falling from Lawyer’s Suit, NEWSWEEK
(Feb. 6, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/9BAX-PQ23.
23. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Cnty. of Riverside, 478
U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (concluding that a “conclusory assertion” of the overriding
interest is insufficient to overcome the First Amendment right).
24. COVID-19 Integrated County View, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION https://perma.cc/A2X7-V26F.
25. The judge might take into account the size of the courtroom, the
ventilation system, the community’s vaccination rate, local population density,
whether any parties mandated to be present are high risk, or other factors that
local public health officials are considering when deciding the level of risk that
coronavirus transmission poses to the community at the time of the
proceeding.
26. See Sigal Samuel, How You’ll Know when Covid-19 Has Gone from
“Pandemic” to “Endemic”, VOX (Oct. 22, 2021, 12:10 PM),
https://perma.cc/4NR5-287K.
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Failure to Consider Alternatives to Closure is Inadequate

Another way in which Smith’s approach to the Waller test
encourages deviation from precedent is in the conclusion that
“there are no reasonable alternatives to closure.”27 But even if a
closure is partially or totally justified, the court must consider
all alternatives,28 and that consideration should form a
substantial part of the analysis. Yet Smith essentially gives up
before he has even begun. He provides and immediately
dismisses examples—requiring hazmat suits and antibody or
other medical testing—that would be cost prohibitive for courts
to implement before concluding that in-person access is
unreasonable.29
Smith suggests that transcripts or recordings are suitable
replacements for a public trial, without considering how the
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is rooted in
contemporaneous observation.30 Judges and practitioners are
particularly well-positioned to understand that reviewing a
transcript or recording is not a comparable experience to
contemporaneous observation. District courts do consider
transcripts and recordings, often finding them an inadequate
substitute.31
B. The COVID-19 Pandemic Allows for Reasonable Alternatives
to Total Closure
Some judges have taken up the reasonable alternatives
mantle and come up with fairly creative alternatives. This past
summer, courts began holding trials in locations ranging from
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 10.
28. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (emphasizing that
trial courts “are required to consider alternatives to closure”).
29. See Smith, supra note 1, at 10. In fact, courts have devised and
implemented a number of reasonable alternatives to closure, some as early as
summer 2020. See sources cited infra note 35.
30. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (“The knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.” (emphasis
added)).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348 (3d Cir. 1994);
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1072 (3d Cir.1984); Soc’y of
Pro. Journalists v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 578 (D. Utah 1985)
(explaining why “a transcript cannot replace the right to an open hearing”).
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ballrooms to county fairgrounds.32 In another case in which a
judge found members of the public could not be physically
present, the judge ensured that remote spectators would be
visible in the courtroom.33
Community spread of COVID-19 has fluctuated greatly
over the past two years. There have been times when local
conditions have made it appropriate to allow a limited number
of members of the public to be physically present. When the risk
was low or moderate, but there were still substantial concerns
related to infectious spread in the courtroom, judges should have
considered restrictions on access akin to constitutionally
permissible security restrictions, such as requiring those
entering the courthouse to comply with some form of public
health restrictions.34
None of this is to say that if courts find some form of
physical access appropriate, they should remove remote access.
Providing the two in tandem allows social distancing in
accordance with public health regulations while fully protecting
constitutional rights. Further, courts are required to provide
remote access when members of the public seeking to access
court proceedings have pre-existing conditions or other health
concerns such that in-person attendance would burden their
First Amendment rights.35 A tandem approach is the best way
32. Laura Kusisto, Ballrooms Become Courtrooms to Get Jury Trials
Moving, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2021, 11:59 AM), https://perma.cc/TGL9-D7EC.
33. United States v. Babichenko, 508 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 (D. Idaho 2020)
(“The two-way video feed honors the special importance community and family
participation have in our judicial system.”).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Trimarco, No. 17-CR-583 (JMA), 2020 WL
5211051, at *2–*3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020) (describing courthouse entry
requirements established for all of the Eastern District of New York, including
the requirement that attendees pass a temperature test, answer a
questionnaire, and wear a mask, as a partial closure that advanced an
overriding interest and finding the partial closure was no broader than
necessary); see also Calvert County Circuit Courthouse Reverts to Phase III
Effective Now Through Feb. 8, BAY NET (Jan. 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/69KFWY6Y; David Brand & Rob Abruzzese, No Fevers Allowed: Temperature
Checks Begin at NYC Courthouses, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (July 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2W8S-J9B3.
35. See Paula Reed Ward, As Allegheny County Judge Offers Remote
Court Access, Lawsuit Could Be Dismissed, TRIB LIVE (Mar. 29, 2021, 2:57 PM),
https://perma.cc/5GRH-DX62; see also Complaint at 14, Abolitionist Law Ctr.
v. Judge Anthony M. Mariani, No. 2:21-CV-00285-CV (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2021)
(describing a lawsuit alleging First Amendment claims that resulted in remote
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to vindicate constitutional rights while protecting public health
when it is appropriate to allow some form of in-person access.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no constitutional basis for categorical court
closures or for failing to consider alternatives to closure because
of the pandemic. Judges have long been equipped to make
closure determinations based on local public health information
and have had access to reliable, local public health data
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. There was no need for
near categorical approval of COVID-19 closures at the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic and there certainly is no basis for one
going forward. Courts have and will continue to provide
examples of alternatives to closure, reflecting creativity and
flexibility. Applying the Waller test in a manner contrary to that
consistently endorsed by the Supreme Court is a violation of the
First and Sixth Amendments that should concern all parties
involved, as well as anyone concerned with our courts’
commitment to transparency and democratic values.
Every actor in the criminal legal system has a role in
ensuring public access to the courts and upholding the
constitution,36 and that obligation is especially urgent as we
begin to enter the third year of the pandemic. Smith argues that
there is “little danger of wrongdoing . . . that requires the
watchful eye of the public to stamp out,”37 but in fact there is a
grave danger in using a pandemic with no end in sight to create
an exception to fundamental constitutional rights. It is at a
moment like this, when government at all levels is claiming
access granted to members of the public attempting to observe court who had
pre-existing conditions).
36. This is especially true of the judge. See Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin.
Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (“When it comes to protecting the right
of access, the judge is the public interest’s principal champion.”). Prosecutors
also have a specific role in ensuring Waller is correctly applied and that judges
are aware of their role in upholding Waller. See Luke Cass, In Open Court:
Courtroom Closures and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial, 67
DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 31, 51 (2019) (explaining “prosecutors should
ordinarily oppose courtroom closures . . . [and] have Waller and a handful of
other cases in their trial box at the ready to edify the court about these issues
and the fact that the trial judge will bear ultimate responsibility for public
access to her courtroom”).
37. Smith, supra note 1, at 7.
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extraordinary powers for the public good, that rights protecting
the public’s ability to serve as a check on the criminal legal
system and the arbitrary exercise of government authority are
the most tested and the most essential.

